Tag: Equality Act

Impartiality on Parade: High Court Judgment on Police at Pride Signals Warning for All Public Bodies

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The High Court ruling in Smith v Northumbria Police found police participation in Pride unlawful due to ideological partiality. The judgment has wide implications, warning public bodies—like councils, schools, and NHS trusts—that sponsoring or endorsing Pride events aligned with gender ideology may breach duties of impartiality, misuse public funds, and violate the rights of those with protected beliefs under equality law. Public neutrality is not optional.

Smith v Northumbria Police sets precedent against ideological partisanship in public institutions—from forces to councils, schools, and services

In a defining moment for the principle of impartiality in British public life, the High Court has ruled that Northumbria Police acted unlawfully by participating in a Pride event in a manner that conveyed ideological alignment with gender identity politics. The ruling in Smith v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2025] EWHC 1805 (Admin) makes clear that public authorities have no legal entitlement to side with one set of beliefs over another in live political or philosophical debates¹.

While the case concerned a police force, its implications are far broader. It places public authorities—including councils, schools, libraries, NHS Trusts, and publicly funded cultural bodies—on clear notice: you may not lawfully take sides in live political or ideological disputes, even under the banner of “inclusion.”

Mr Justice Linden’s ruling emphasised that the Progress Pride flag is not ideologically neutral, especially given its strong association with trans activism and groups that explicitly exclude gender-critical individuals². Participating in or sponsoring Pride under that symbol, or in association with activist groups that explicitly exclude dissenting views, creates a reasonable perception of partiality. That perception alone is unlawful in many public contexts³.Subscribed

The Limits of the Equality Act and PSED
The case exposed the misapplication of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) by police and other institutions. Northumbria Police had claimed that their support for Pride, and by extension gender ideology, was justified by the need to “advance equality of opportunity.” But the court firmly rejected that reasoning, stating that:

“The Defendant’s actions created the reasonable impression of partiality in a contested moral and political debate. The Equality Act does not override the police duty of neutrality.”⁴

The same logic applies to publicly funded schools who promote Pride Month without balance, councils that fly ideological flags from civic buildings, and leisure centres, libraries, or hospitals that host activist stalls without acknowledging protected beliefs on the other side.

Participation in politically or ideologically aligned events—such as Pride, where gender identity ideology is now deeply embedded—must be scrutinised. Not only must public authorities avoid taking sides; they must not even create the impression that they do⁵.

Schools, Councils, and Cultural Capture
Many public institutions have become complicit in this ideological overreach. Examples include:

  • Schools compelling student participation in Pride-themed assemblies or displays, while failing to acknowledge the protected status of gender-critical views under the Equality Act⁶.
  • Council-run gyms and swimming pools festooned with Progress flags during June, with no balancing representation of dissenting beliefs.
  • Libraries and museums co-hosting drag events, “ally training,” or exhibitions steeped in gender ideology, with no input from alternative perspectives.
  • Town halls sponsoring Pride floats while event organisers explicitly bar groups who express biologically grounded views of sex.

All such conduct is now in legal question. The Smith ruling confirms that the appearance of alignment with one side of the gender identity debate is enough to breach duties of fairness and impartiality, even if the underlying intent is framed as “inclusion.”⁷

This is particularly acute in light of recent cases affirming that gender-critical views are protected under UK equality law and the European Convention on Human Rights⁸. Public institutions who display Progress Pride symbols, or participate in events where such beliefs are rejected or excluded, are now vulnerable to legal challenge.

Public Funds, Political Activism
The ruling also intersects with long-standing restrictions on political activity by public bodies. For example, the Education Act 1996 requires schools to maintain political neutrality, especially when teaching controversial topics⁹. The Local Government Act 1986 prohibits councils from spending public funds on material that promotes a political view¹⁰.

The embrace of Pride—especially in its modern, gender-ideological form—may now be viewed not as neutral community engagement, but as partisan expression. Public funds spent on ideological branding, flag raising, or stall sponsorship may constitute misuse of public money.

Towards a Reset in Public Institutions
For years, Pride events have enjoyed automatic institutional support. But as the Smith judgment shows, this support can no longer be taken for granted when such events are clearly aligned with contested political agendas.

This ruling restores an essential constitutional principle: public authorities must serve all citizens impartially, regardless of creed, conscience, or belief.

They must not act as champions of ideologies, no matter how popular or progressive those ideologies claim to be.

What Now?
In light of the Smith judgment, public institutions must:

  • Reassess participation in Pride events, especially if official branding, uniformed staff, or sponsored materials are involved.
  • Cease use of the Progress Pride flag or similar symbols that imply endorsement of contested ideological positions.
  • Review all equality and diversity training to ensure it is ideologically neutral and includes protected belief perspectives.
  • Respect political neutrality in schools, ensuring pupils are exposed to all lawful perspectives on sex and gender.
  • Apply the Public Sector Equality Duty fairly, acknowledging the rights and dignity of all protected belief groups, not just the fashionable ones.

A Turning Point
This judgment may prove to be a watershed moment in resisting the ideological overreach of state-funded bodies. It affirms that the law is not a tool of cultural revolution but a shield for all citizens, especially those whose views have been maligned or suppressed.

For gender-critical women, for faithful Christians, for traditional moral thinkers, and for ordinary citizens concerned by institutional drift into activism, Smith v Northumbria Police offers a powerful affirmation:

Your beliefs are lawful. The state may not take sides. Impartiality is not optional.

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Footnotes

¹ Smith v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2025] EWHC 1805 (Admin)
² Ibid., §§15–16
³ Ibid., §144
⁴ Ibid., §139
⁵ Ibid., §§63–66
⁶ Equality Act 2010, s.10; Forstater v CGD Europe [2021] UKEAT/0105/20/JOJ
⁷ Smith, §48
⁸ For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16
⁹ Education Act 1996, ss.406–407
¹⁰ Local Government Act 1986, s.2

Silencing Dissent? Labour’s Islamophobia Definition and the Threat to Academic Freedom

Published on by TheOldRoman1 Comment

Peers warn proposed definition could become a de facto blasphemy law on UK campuses and beyond.

As the Labour government reviews legal definitions of anti-Muslim hatred, traditional Catholics and civil libertarians alike should resist the ideological drift that falsely equates religious criticism with racism. At stake is not merely a terminological preference but the future boundary between lawful dissent and criminalised speech. The question is urgent: will criticism of Islam become functionally equivalent to racism in law and public life?

A Shifting Landscape of Definitions
In early 2025, the newly elected Labour government under Prime Minister Keir Starmer inherited a policy initiative launched under the Conservative government to define the parameters of anti-Muslim hatred. The initiative took the form of a Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia, chaired by Dominic Grieve KC, with the goal of producing a non-statutory definition that could inform hate crime enforcement, education policy, and civic guidance.

Despite assurances that any forthcoming definition would not be legally binding, Mr Grieve has expressed the hope that it would be “embedded in university speech codes” to curb so-called “micro-aggressions”¹. More than thirty peers from across the political spectrum have now written to Mr Grieve, warning that such a move would have a “chilling effect” on free speech and effectively reintroduce a blasphemy law in secular guise².

The APPG’s 2018 Definition: Ambiguity as Ideology
The most widely circulated definition of Islamophobia remains that of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims, issued in 2018:

“Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.”³

This definition, which has been adopted by the Labour Party in opposition and by many local authorities, has drawn criticism for its vagueness and ideological presuppositions. “Muslimness” is undefined and unbounded. It could refer to theological beliefs, cultural customs, political behaviours, or dress—leaving citizens unsure of what speech is permitted. Civil liberties groups, ex-Muslim reformers, and Christian leaders alike have warned that this framing protects not just persons from hate, but ideas from scrutiny, inverting the very principles of a pluralistic society.

Islam Is Not a Race
The most dangerous presumption in the APPG definition is its claim that Islamophobia is a form of racism. This is conceptually incoherent. Islam is not a race—it is a global religion with adherents from every ethnic background. To label criticism of Islamic belief, law, or history as racism is to commit a category error—one that has already been used to stigmatise theological dissent.

From a Catholic perspective, the danger is acute. The Gospel proclaims Christ crucified and risen, the only Son of the Father, and Saviour of mankind. Islam explicitly denies these doctrines. If the critique or rejection of Islamic teaching is redefined as racism, then evangelisation itself becomes hate speech.

A Definition Drafted in Secret?
Despite the gravity of its task, the Working Group has operated with a remarkable lack of transparency. Its terms of reference state that its proceedings are confidential, its advice to government private, and that the group “does not speak on behalf of HMG”⁴. No public list of members has been released, no minutes published, and no evidence of consultation with Christian, Hindu, Sikh, or secular groups—despite the fact that some of these communities are frequently misidentified in so-called “Islamophobic” incidents⁵.

This lack of oversight has been criticised in Parliament by Baroness Fox of Buckley⁶ and flagged by civil liberties groups including the Free Speech Union, the National Secular Society, and researchers at Policy Exchange⁷. Some working group members have known affiliations with Islamist-linked advocacy networks, raising serious questions about the group’s ideological balance and institutional objectivity⁸.

Peers Speak Out
In a letter dated 14 July 2025, more than thirty peers—including Lord Moylan, Baroness Fox, Lord Frost, and Baroness Deech—raised additional red flags. They warned that the definition, if endorsed by government, will likely be embedded across the public sector: in universities, schools, NHS trusts, councils, regulatory bodies, and the courts⁹. They cite the case of Sir Trevor Phillips, suspended by Labour in 2020 under a non-statutory Islamophobia code, and warn that future disciplinary processes could follow the same path.

The letter also warns of a false sense of effectiveness. They note that the adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism has not curbed antisemitic hate incidents—especially in the wake of the Hamas attacks of October 2023—and that there is no evidence that defining Islamophobia would reduce hate crime against Muslims¹⁰.

The Grooming Gang Scandal
One of the strongest arguments raised is that vague and ideologically slanted definitions have historically suppressed whistleblowing. Baroness Casey’s National Audit found that police officers, councillors, and journalists failed to raise concerns about grooming gangs in towns like Rotherham and Telford because of fear they would be labelled “Islamophobic”¹¹. Indeed, public figures who did speak out—such as Sarah Champion MP and feminist campaigner Julie Bindel—were denounced by advocacy groups and nominated for “Islamophobe of the Year” awards.

Conflating Faith and Hatred
The peers urge Mr Grieve to drop the word “Islamophobia” altogether. They argue that the term blurs the crucial distinction between hatred of Muslims (a moral and legal evil) and criticism of Islam (a fundamental right in a free society). The term anti-Muslim hatred better names the wrong—targeting persons, not ideas. As they point out, this approach aligns with the Public Order Act 1986 and the Equality Act 2010, both of which protect individuals from religiously aggravated offences without prohibiting theological debate.

Proposed Solutions
The peers make four key recommendations:

  • Broaden the Working Group to include non-Muslim religious voices and free speech advocates;
  • Postpone any formal recommendations until the national inquiry into grooming gangs concludes;
  • Drop the word Islamophobia from any proposed terminology;
  • Submit any definition to full parliamentary scrutiny before government adoption¹².

Why the Words Matter
Catholics have a vital interest in this debate. Our fidelity to revealed truth requires us to proclaim the Lordship of Jesus Christ and the unique claims of the Gospel—claims which Islam explicitly denies. This must never be pathologised as hate. The terms anti-Muslim hatred and anti-Muslim prejudice are morally precise and legally sufficient. The term Islamophobia, by contrast, is a political invention used to place one religious worldview beyond critique.

Let the government name the evil clearly: hatred of persons, not scrutiny of religion. And let Catholics, with clarity and charity, defend both truth and freedom.

  1. Letter to Dominic Grieve KC, 14 July 2025, p. 3.
  2. Ibid., p. 2.
  3. All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, Islamophobia Defined (2018).
  4. UK Government, Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia: Terms of Reference (March 2025).
  5. The Spectator, “The Islamophobia Working Group is Unbalanced and Opaque,” April 2025.
  6. Baroness Claire Fox, Parliamentary debate, Hansard, 20 March 2024.
  7. PoliticsHome, “Concerns Raised Over Lack of Diversity in Islamophobia Working Group,” May 2025.
  8. Policy Exchange / FWI Report, “Renewed Effort to Stifle Free Speech in the UK,” June 2025.
  9. Letter to Dominic Grieve KC, 14 July 2025, p. 3.
  10. Ibid., p. 4.
  11. Ibid., p. 7.
  12. Ibid., p. 10.

Quiet Conformity: The New RSHE Mandates and the State’s Imposition of Gender Ideology

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How England’s updated sex education guidance undermines parental rights, marginalises religious truth, and reshapes children’s identity through legal compulsion.

In July 2025, the Department for Education quietly issued a revised version of its Relationships, Sex and Health Education (RSHE) Statutory Guidance, replacing the 2019 framework that had shaped England’s approach to teaching children about relationships, sex, and wellbeing. While couched in cautious bureaucratic language, this updated guidance deepens the ideological commitments of its predecessor—particularly in relation to the affirmation of gender ideology in both primary and secondary education.Subscribed

The new statutory document reasserts the primacy of the Equality Act 2010, stating that schools “must ensure that they comply with the relevant provisions” of that Act, under which “sexual orientation and gender reassignment are amongst the protected characteristics”¹. As in the 2019 edition, gender reassignment is treated not merely as a category for legal non-discrimination, but as a legitimate and affirmed identity to be integrated into school life and curriculum. In practice, this compels schools to treat a child’s declaration of transgender identification as a protected personal reality, and any failure to do so could be classed as discriminatory.

The curriculum expectations are unequivocal. The guidance mandates that “all pupils [are] to have been taught LGBT content at a timely point as part of this area of the curriculum”². This is to be “fully integrated into their programmes of study… rather than delivered as a stand-alone unit or lesson”³. In other words, affirming LGBT content—including trans-identification—is no longer optional, even for schools with religious character.

This development is more than pedagogical; it is ideological. The 2025 guidance instructs schools to “avoid language which might normalise harmful behaviour among young people—for example gendered language which might normalise male violence or stigmatise boys”⁴. Though framed as safeguarding advice, such language mirrors the ideological presuppositions of radical gender theory: that traditional sex distinctions are not only outdated but potentially harmful, and that gender itself is a social construct detached from biological reality.

While the document nominally allows schools with a religious character to “teach the distinctive faith perspective on relationships,” it immediately qualifies this by insisting that “teaching should reflect the law (including the Equality Act 2010) as it applies to relationships”⁵. Thus, a Catholic school may still teach the Church’s anthropology—that man is created male and female, that sex and gender are not severable—but it may not do so in a way that would undermine or fail to affirm transgender identification, lest it fall afoul of equality legislation. The Church’s witness is thereby marginalised, tolerated only within limits set by the State.

This has profound implications for parental rights and religious liberty. While the guidance upholds the right of parents to request withdrawal from sex education, it reaffirms that there is “no right to withdraw their pupils from relationships and health education”⁶—subjects that now regularly include ideological content on gender identity, relationships, and sexuality. Nor may parents prevent children from being taught about transgenderism in integrated contexts under the banner of inclusion or safeguarding. From three terms before their sixteenth birthday, the child may override even a parent’s request to withdraw from sex education⁷.

The erosion of natural and moral categories does not stop at curriculum content. The RSHE guidance, though not primarily focused on facilities, indirectly affirms policies that challenge the integrity of single-sex spaces. By insisting that schools create environments that are “inclusive of all pupils” and that they avoid any action that “discriminates against protected characteristics”—including gender reassignment—it places institutional pressure on schools to accommodate self-declared gender identity in areas such as toilets and changing rooms. However, what the guidance omits is just as telling: it does not affirm, clarify, or remind schools of their existing legal right to maintain single-sex facilities under Schedule 3 of the Equality Act 2010, which permits such provision where it is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”⁸

In fact, schools are still legally entitled to provide toilets, showers, and changing spaces separated by biological sex, especially in consideration of safeguarding, dignity, and privacy. Yet by failing to state this explicitly, the Department leaves headteachers and governors exposed to activist pressure and confusion—inviting the assumption that to limit access to facilities based on sex, rather than gender identity, would be discriminatory. In reality, it remains lawful for schools to provide single-sex spaces and to make case-by-case decisions about access, particularly where safeguarding or the rights of other pupils are concerned⁹.

In this way, the State places itself not only as the provider of education, but as the final arbiter of human identity. It is not simply transmitting knowledge, but shaping the self-understanding of the child—defining what it means to be a person, a man, a woman, a moral actor. As Catholics, we must reject such an overreach. It is not the role of the State to dictate the content of the human soul, nor to impose a pseudo-anthropology that severs body from identity, nature from vocation, and freedom from truth.

The Church teaches with clarity and compassion that our identity is not self-constructed, but divinely given. “Male and female He created them” (Gen. 1:27). This foundational truth about human nature is not a matter of bigotry or fear, but of love—of fidelity to the God who made us, and to the flourishing He desires for each person.

It is not enough for Catholic educators to quietly comply, nor for parents to outsource their children’s moral formation to an ideologically compromised system. We must act. Catholic schools must form the whole person in truth—not only in religious instruction, but across the curriculum. Parents must reclaim their rightful role as the first educators of their children. And the Church must equip its faithful to resist the slow imposition of untruth through policy dressed in pastoral concern.

Where the State demands silent assent, we must respond with faithful witness. Where the culture says affirm, we must have the courage to say no—not out of malice, but out of love for the child, for truth, and for the God who is Truth incarnate.

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  1. RSHE Statutory Guidance – July 2025, p. 36.
  2. Ibid., p. 36.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid., p. 5.
  5. Ibid., p. 37.
  6. Ibid., p. 6.
  7. Ibid., p. 6.
  8. Equality Act 2010, Schedule 3, Part 7, Paragraph 27.
  9. Department for Education, Gender Questioning Children: Non-Statutory Guidance for Schools in England, December 2023.